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1. Introduction 
Climate change is high on the global policy agenda, and studies like IPCC (2007) and Stern (2007) 
have established the need for ambitious international climate agreements and strong domestic climate 
policies. Early steps include the EU Emission Trading Scheme, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
Copenhagen Accord; these and future efforts will have important consequences for the oil market. At 
the same time, energy-importing countries are concerned about energy security and oil dependence. 
Most developed countries are net oil importers, and the fact that one third of global oil exports come 
from the Middle East brings concern about macroeconomic disruption costs from the risk of oil price 
shocks, constraints on foreign policy (e.g., questions about human rights and democratic freedom in 
oil-exporting nations), and the possible funding of terrorist activities by oil revenues. Europe and the 
United States are expected to increase their import dependency on oil over the next decades as their 
own supplies are depleted (EIA 2010), whereas the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) may increase its market share and, consequently, its market power. 
 
Both climate change impacts and energy security call for policies to reduce the demand for oil in most 
oil-importing countries. These goals can be achieved through a number of different policies such as 
mandated biofuel shares, emissions standards, a quota system for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, 
taxation of CO2 emissions or energy use, support of renewable energy production, and standards for 
energy equipment.1 Examples of policies that are rarely cost-effective with respect to climate change 
or energy security, yet often preferred by policy makers, are those that specifically target the transport 
sector, such as a fuel tax, a required share of biofuels in fuel consumption, and emissions standards for 
vehicles (see Parry et al. 2007). All are either implemented or suggested in the European Union and 
the United States, but to different degrees. While the U.S. has rather low tax rates by international 
standards, fuel taxes are relatively high in many European countries (OECD 2009). On the other hand, 
the United States have traditionally favored fuel economy standards, and aggressively tightened their 
standards in 2007 and 2009.2 Biofuel requirements have been introduced in both the U.S. and the EU 
in recent years.3 
                                                     
1 A combination of goals will usually imply a different mix of policies than if one only had the aim of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. For instance, broad taxes are more cost-effective than fuel standards or biofuel shares if the aim is to reduce 
global warming. 
2 The new Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for manufacturers are equivalent to 39 miles per gallon for 
their new car fleets and 30 miles per gallon for their light-truck fleets by 2016 (see, e.g., Parry 2009). 
3 All Member States in the EU are required to increase their share of biofuels in the transport sector to at least ten per cent in 
2020 (see e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/doc/sec_2008_85-2_ia_annex.pdf). 
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The transport sector is essential when studying the demand for oil. According to EIA (2010), 
transportation accounted for 53 percent of the world total liquids consumption in 2007, and the share 
is expected to increase to 61 percent in 2035. Also, the world’s transportation systems are more than 
90 percent dependent on oil and oil products, so few alternatives can compete widely with oil in the 
transport market today. Biofuels are obviously candidates, but are mostly uncompetitive without 
regulations in favor of such fuels (Brazilian ethanol being a possible exception). Coal- and gas-to-
liquids are other candidates, but are too expensive today with current prices of fossil fuels. The same 
holds for electric cars and hydrogen cars. In the future, however, several of these technologies may 
become competitive versus oil, even without special treatment. 
 
Policies to regulate transport may have different impacts in a competitive market and a market with a 
dominant producer. The oil market can hardly be considered competitive, as OPEC exhibits at least 
some degree of market power (see, e.g., Berg et al. 1997a; Alhajii 2004). Thus, in this paper we study 
the impacts of different types of transportation regulations in the presence of market power, and 
compare with the corresponding impacts in a competitive market. In particular we compare three 
different types of policy instruments: a fuel tax, a required share of biofuels in the transport market, 
and fuel efficiency. 
 
The literature relevant for our study can be divided into two strands: one that studies regulations in the 
transport sector in more detail by mainly focusing on the demand side, and one that analyses the oil 
market by focusing on the supply side. Starting with the first strand of literature, most studies on 
regulations in the transportation sector are demand-side analyses (assuming fixed oil market prices) 
that use a utility function as the starting point to calculate optimal fuel taxes (e.g., Parry and Small 
2005; West and Williams 2007; Parry 2009), measure welfare effects of fuel economy regulations 
(e.g., Fischer et al. 2007), or calculate costs of different regulations to meet certain levels of gasoline 
consumption (e.g., West and Williams 2005). Morrow et al. (2010) study the impacts of different 
policies to reduce oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions from the U.S. transportation sector 
but assume an exogenous oil price. The large literature on fuel-efficiency standards introduces market 
power when examining effects of such standards under possibilities of price discrimination when 
consumers have different tastes (e.g., Plourde and Bardis 1999) and the effects of standards on cars 
sales, prices, and fuel consumption (e.g., Goldberg 1998). But these studies introduce market power in 
the supply of cars and not in the oil market. The economic literature on biofuels has also emerged the 
last few years (see, e.g., Rajagopal and Zilberman 2007 for a survey).  De Gorter and Just (2007) study 
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the effect of biofuel subsides on oil consumption in a competitive market, while Hertel et al. (2010) 
analyze the impacts of biofuel mandates in a global computable general equilibrium model.  
 
A recent paper on biofuels that makes a link to the second strand of literature is Hochman et al. 
(2010). It focuses on the impact of biofuels when OPEC acts as a cartel. The authors specify two 
regions in the world—an oil-exporting and an oil-importing region—and study the different impacts 
on the oil price in the two regions using a static model. However, the paper does not make 
comparisons with other policy instruments to reduce oil consumption.  
 
Another relevant paper on the oil market is by Berger et al. (1992), who studied the impact of 
international agreements to reduce CO2 emissions on fossil fuel prices based on tradable emissions 
permits and an international CO2 tax. They found that while the two instruments have the same effect 
on the producer price (i.e., market price) of fossil fuels in competitive fossil fuel markets, direct 
regulation in the form of tradable quotas tends to imply higher producer prices than an international 
CO2 tax giving the same reduction in total CO2 emissions. Strand (2009) also studies the impacts of 
carbon taxes and tradable permits, assuming two blocs of countries: an oil-importing region that 
regulates fossil fuel consumption and produces alternative fuels, and an oil-exporting region without 
any regulations. However, the paper focuses on strategic behavior for rent extraction, such as export 
taxation, rather than effects of market power.  
 
Some studies of carbon taxation consider intertemporal supply under different market settings (e.g., 
Berg et al. 1997b), but few studies compare policy instruments in an intertemporal setting when 
market power is taken into account. For instance, Sinn (2008) studies different policy measures from 
an intertemporal supply-side perspective for a non-renewable resource but does not consider market 
power on the supply side. 
 
In this paper, we combine the two strands of literature. Instead of focusing on the preferences of 
consumers, we study the importance of the supply side of the oil market for the effects of transport 
regulations. We do not consider intertemporal optimization on the supply side but rather focus on 
market power. Our interest is on the effects on the price and quantity of oil consumption under 
different market settings. We find that particularly price effects can be dramatically different under 
market power compared to in a competitive market, especially if fuel efficiency standards are raised. 
Price effects are important, and not just for distributional reasons (i.e., who bears the burden of the 
policy, consumers or producers). Assuming, for instance, that transport regulations follow from a 
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climate treaty, signatory countries may be concerned about increased emissions in non-signatory 
countries due to a lower oil price (a phenomenon called carbon leakage; see Felder and Rutherford, 
1993). It is also widely known that environmental regulations may affect terms of trade (Krutilla 
1991), and oil-importing countries may worry about policy measures that can increase the oil price. 
Therefore, we compare the effects on the oil price of different regulations under different market 
settings.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we use a static model for a closed economy to 
study the impacts of the different policy instruments in a competitive market and a monopoly market. 
While both forms are too simplistic in describing the oil market, they represent useful indicators of the 
effects of transport regulations when market power is introduced. In the third section, we extend the 
analysis to an open economy to further study volume effects, as well as changes in terms of trade and 
carbon leakage, from regulations in the transport sector. The final section concludes. 
2. Transport regulations in a closed economy 
To focus on the effects of market power, we use a static partial equilibrium model, starting with a 
closed market. A natural interpretation is to think of this as the global oil market. Nevertheless, we 
will also discuss implications for a single oil-importing country, and in the following section, we will 
model an open market explicitly. As the substitution possibilities are small in the transport market, we 
implicitly keep prices of other energy goods constant.4  
 
We study different transport regulations to reduce fossil fuel consumption and hence CO2 emissions 
under the assumption that they are widely introduced. If we think of the global oil market, these 
regulations could be the outcome of an international climate agreement. So far it seems more realistic 
to consider such regulations within a single country or a group of countries than the entire globe as not 
all countries are likely to sign a climate agreement, and that is why we examine an open economy in 
the next section. The analysis of a closed market will still give useful insight, to a situation where a 
large part of the oil market becomes regulated. 
 
The demand-side regulations we consider are the following:  
 
                                                     
4 In the future, given significant progress for alternative transportation technologies, this assumption may become less valid. 
To simplify the analysis throughout the paper, we further ignore oil consumption outside the transport sector. 
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i) A fuel tax interpreted as a tax t per unit of oil consumed. 
ii) A required share of biofuels such that for each unit of oil that is sold, one also needs to sell a 
units of biofuel (e.g., gasoline mixed with ethanol).5 
iii) An efficiency standard interpreted as a binding minimum average vehicle efficiency m, 
measured as miles per gallon (mileage). 
 
We will compare the effects of these policy instruments in a competitive market (C) and a monopoly 
market (M), assuming throughout the paper that the changes in t, a, or m are the same in the two 
market settings. In the next section we also consider a market with a dominant firm and a competitive 
fringe. 
2.1. The demand for oil 
Let us start by defining the consumption of transport services, measured in miles driven (q), as a 
function of mileage (m), oil consumption for transport use (x), and biofuel requirements (a). Then we 
have 
 
(1) (1 )q m x m ax m a x= ⋅ + ⋅ = + . 
 
To drive a mile, one can use oil and/or biofuels as the fuel source.6 As oil is measured in gallons, m⋅x 
is the number of miles driven on oil and m⋅a⋅x is the number of miles driven on biofuels. Alternatively, 
(1+a)x is the blended fuel. We see that for a given consumption of transport services q, increased 
mileage or share of biofuels means that the consumption of oil is reduced accordingly. 
 
Now, let us turn to the demand for oil. To do this, assume that an increase in m increases mileage by 
the same percentage rate for all transport consumers, so that an increase in m has the same effect on 
the demand function for all quantities of oil. Moreover, we disregard any costs related to making cars 
more fuel efficient and costs related to supplying the necessary amount of biofuels. We assume the 
government covers these costs, not consumers or producers in the oil market. Thus, we assume that the 
                                                     
5 Alternatively, there is a required share of biofuels interpreted as a fraction â of total transport fuel consumption, where a = 
â/(1-â). 
6 We disregard other alternative transport technologies, such as electricity and hydrogen, as they are usually not regulated 
through any policy measures studied here. 
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price of biofuels is equal to the price of oil — e.g., that gasoline is mixed with biofuels when sold at a 
gas station.7 
 
Let Pq(q) denote the inverse demand function for transport services — i.e., the price consumers are 
willing to pay for an extra mile as a function of miles driven. Furthermore, Px(x) denotes the inverse 
demand function for oil facing the producer(s) of oil. Note that the consumer price of oil is then  
Px(x) + t — i.e., the producer price plus the fuel tax. Consequently, we have 
 
(2) 
( )( ) xq
P x tP q
m
+
= . 
 
Thus, the price per mile driven is equal to the consumer price of oil per gallon divided by the mileage. 
From (1) and (2) we can write the inverse demand function for oil facing the producer(s) of oil: 
 
(3) ( ) ( (1 ) )x qP x mP m a x t= + − , 
 
where we assume Pq ' (q) < 0 and thus Px ' (x) < 0. 
 
Equation (3) shows quite clearly that the three different policy instruments affect the inverse demand 
function for oil very differently. This is illustrated for a linear demand function in Figure 1, where Pxi 
and i=a,m,t are the new demand functions under the different regulation schemes. A fuel tax, t, shifts 
the inverse demand function downward, while a higher required share of biofuels, a, makes the 
function steeper, with the same maximum price as before. 
 
                                                     
7 This also follows the assumption in Hochman et al. (2010) that biofuels and gasoline are supplied to the same price. If we 
assumed, for instance, that the oil producer has to buy the biofuels at a price different than its marginal costs and then supply 
the blend in the market, a change in the blending requirement, a, would also give a change in the marginal cost of the blended 
fuel. 
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Figure 1. Impacts of different policy instruments on the demand for oil 
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Increased efficiency, m, also makes the inverse demand function steeper, but the maximum price (if 
finite) increases because it becomes cheaper to drive a mile if prices are unchanged. Thus, as opposed 
to the two other instruments, increased efficiency may increase oil demand for some (high) price 
levels.8 To see this, note first that with higher mileage one does not need as much gasoline to drive the 
same distance as before, which lowers oil demand. This is particularly relevant when consumers’ price 
responsiveness is low (e.g., at low prices). On the other hand, if consumers are price responsive, the 
lower cost of driving a mile will stimulate demand for transport. This is called the rebound effect in 
                                                     
8 The demand curves will not cross if the price elasticity is constant. In this case, the new demand function will either be 
above or below the old one. One example where the Pxm-curve will be below the Px-curve for all x is Px = x−k, where k < 1 
(i.e., price elasticity below one in absolute value). 
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the literature (see, e.g., Portney et al. 2003; Small and Van Dender 2007).9 If the rebound effect is very 
strong, which may be the case if consumers are very price responsive (see the next subsection), 
transport volumes may be stimulated to such a degree that even demand for gasoline increases.   
2.2. Quantity effects  
Consider first the quantity effects of the different policies in competitive and monopoly markets. For 
simplicity we assume that a = t = 0 and m = 1 initially. In other words, we study the effects of 
introducing transport regulations where there are no prior regulations. To simplify the notation we use 
P(x) instead of Px(x). 
2.2.1. Competitive oil market  
Assume that a representative, profit-maximizing producer faces a cost function c(x), with the 
following properties: c '(x) > 0 and c ''(x) ≥ 0. As shown in the appendix (equation (A4)), we get the 
following effects of the different instruments in a competitive market: 
 
 i)      1 0
''( ) '( )
Cdx
dt c x P x
= − <
−
, 
(4) ii)     '( ) 0
''( ) '( )
Cdx xP x
da c x P x
= <
−
, and 
 iii)     
1( ) 1
( )
''( ) '( )
C P x xdx
dm c x P x
ε
 
+  
=
−
, 
 
where ( )( )
'( )
P xx
xP x
ε =  (price elasticity of demand).10 
 
Not surprisingly, and also shown in earlier studies, oil consumption drops if either a tax or a required 
share of biofuels is introduced. On the other hand, we notice from (4) iii) that the effect of increased 
mileage on oil consumption is ambiguous, also shown in Figure 1. If the marginal cost function 
crosses above the intersection of the Px- and the Pxm curves, oil consumption increases when mileage is 
                                                     
9 The crossing demand functions can also be seen from equation (3). Increasing m has two effects as m is multiplied with 
Pq(q) and also increases q everything else given. As P 'q(q)  < 0, we see that Px(x) may either increase or decrease for an 
increase in m. 
10 Note that x(P) is the demand function for oil, which is the inverse of P(x). 
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raised; otherwise it will fall. Furthermore, we see from (4) iii) that the direction of change in 
consumption depends on the size of the price elasticity of demand. 
 
As a reference point to the analysis in a monopoly market, we summarize these conclusions in a 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: In a competitive oil market, introducing fuel taxes and biofuel requirements will reduce 
oil consumption. Increased fuel efficiency will increase oil consumption if and only if the price 
elasticity in the market equilibrium is above one in absolute value. 
 
Proof: This is easily seen from (4) i)–iii). 
 
Most recent empirical analyses seem to conclude that price elasticities are rather low in absolute value 
and most likely below one in the short run (e.g., Hughes et al. 2006; Parry 2009). Thus, if the oil 
market can be viewed as a competitive market, introducing an efficiency standard for transportation 
will most likely reduce total consumption of oil in the short run. This is also the empirical conclusion 
for the U.S. by Small and Van Dender (2007). In the long run, however, the price elasticity can be 
quite high (see, e.g., Sterner 2007).11  
2.2.2. Monopoly market  
To see the effect of transport regulations when market power is introduced, we confront the 
conclusions above with an analysis of a market with a monopoly on the supply side. As we will use 
linear demand and marginal cost functions in Section 3, we will also briefly report the results for linear 
functions. 
 
As shown in the appendix (equations (A9)), the quantity effects of the different policy instruments are 
as follows in a monopoly market: 
 
                                                     
11 If the price elasticity is above unity at high prices (e.g., as with linear and concave demand functions), a gradual increase in 
unit production costs over time due to resource scarcity will increase the likelihood that increased mileage will stimulate 
consumption.  
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 i)     1 1 0
''( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) ( )
Mdx
dt c x P x xP x x
= − = − <
− − Γ
, 
(5) ii)    
( )2 '( ) 2 ( )2 '( ) ''( )
''( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) ( )
M xP x xdx xP x x P x
da c x P x xP x x
γ++
= =
− − Γ
, and 
 iii)    
( )2 '( ) 3 ( ) ( )( ) 3 '( ) ''( )
''( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) ( )
M xP x x xdx P x xP x x P x
dm c x P x xP x x
ε γ+ ++ +
= =
− − Γ
, 
 
where ''( )( )
'( )
P xx x
P x
γ = , and ( ) ''( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) 0x c x P x xP xΓ = − − >  (by the second order condition). In a 
monopoly market we recall that ε(xM) ≤ −1 for the marginal revenue (MR) to be positive.12 
 
We notice that the value of γ(x) is crucial for the impact of the policies. This parameter is the elasticity 
of P ' (x) with respect to x and characterizes the curvature of the demand function. Throughout the 
paper we will distinguish between three cases: i) γ > −1, which means that the inverse demand 
function is either concave (γ > 0), linear (γ = 0), or “slightly convex” (−1 < γ < 0), in the sense that the 
price derivative does not change too fast when x changes; ii) −2 < γ < −1, in which case we will refer 
to a “quite convex” inverse demand function; and iii) γ < −2, which means that the inverse demand 
function is “very convex.”13 
 
From equations (5) we first observe that a tax will unambiguously reduce consumption of oil, just as in 
the competitive market. In the linear case of P''(x) = 0, we can easily show that the relative output 
reduction will be the same in the two market settings. 
 
Further, a required biofuel share will reduce oil consumption if and only if the inverse demand 
function is not very convex (γ > −2). In the linear case, the relative output reduction will be bigger in a 
monopoly market than in a competitive market (unless marginal costs are constant). The reason is that 
the demand function becomes steeper, and thus the monopolist finds it profitable to reduce output 
                                                     
12 As mentioned above, empirical studies find the short-run price elasticity to be less than one (in absolute value) in the oil 
market. However, this does not rule out market power in this market. If the oil market can be characterized as having a 
dominant producer (OPEC) and a competitive fringe (see, e.g., Hansen and Lindholt, 2008), it is profitable for a dominant 
producer to adjust its production to a level where the price elasticity of the residual demand is larger than one (in absolute 
value). This elasticity will be larger than the demand elasticity (in absolute value), so we may still have a dominant producer 
in the oil market even if the demand elasticity is “low.” Also, Hochman et al. (2010) argue that import demand elasticities 
observed by OPEC countries are much larger than price elasticities observed in macro, and they set these to be above one in 
absolute value. In section 3.2, we will investigate the model with a dominant producer. 
13 Note that γ is a function of x — i.e., it is not necessarily constant. We have ruled out γ = −1 and γ = −2. For γ = −2, dP/dx is 
not defined for da>0; see equation (7) below. For γ = −1, we see from (6) and (7) below that dP/dx is similar in a monopoly 
and a competitive market for both dt>0 and da>0.  
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relatively more than in the tax case. However, for more convex inverse demand functions (γ < −2), oil 
consumption will actually increase. Thus, whereas a required share of biofuels always reduces 
consumption in a competitive market, oil consumption will actually increase in a monopoly market if 
the inverse demand function is very convex. Notice, however, that a very convex inverse demand 
function typically (but not necessarily) will lead to negative marginal revenue even for low values of 
x, which makes this outcome (i.e., increased oil consumption) rather unlikely.14  
 
As for the competitive market, the effect of increased fuel efficiency on oil consumption is generally 
ambiguous in a monopoly market. The sign of the numerator in (5) iii) depends on the sum of γ and 
the price elasticity ε. As ε < -1 in a monopoly market, we see that if the inverse demand function is 
very convex (γ < −2), oil consumption will increase when fuel efficiency is increased.15 Oil 
consumption can also increase with γ ≥ -2 if ε + γ < -3. Nevertheless, a more realistic scenario may be 
that -2 < ε < -1 and γ > -1, so that the numerator in (5) iii) is negative, in which case oil consumption 
decreases. 
 
The conclusions can be summarized by the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: With a monopoly supplying oil,  
• introducing fuel taxes will reduce oil consumption;  
• introducing a biofuel requirement will reduce oil consumption if the inverse demand function 
is not very convex (γ > −2), but otherwise increase consumption (γ < −2); and 
• increasing fuel efficiency will reduce oil consumption if the inverse demand function is not 
very convex and not very price elastic (ε + γ > -3), but otherwise increase consumption (ε + γ 
< -3). 
  
Proof: See equation (5) and the text above. 
 
An example of increased fuel efficiency in the oil market is shown in Figure 2. We have here assumed 
that the price elasticity is above one in absolute value in the competitive outcome, so that higher fuel 
efficiency will increase oil demand in this market setting (from xC1 to xC2). On the other hand, it will 
decrease oil demand (from xM1 to xM2) in the presence of a monopoly. This is not accidental. In the 
                                                     
14 One example is P(x) = x-2, in which γ = -3 and MR = -x-2. On the other hand, a demand function where we get higher oil 
consumption by introducing biofuel requirements is P(x) = Min (3 ; 2 + x-2). The intuition here is that marginal revenue 
increases in x. An interior solution requires, however, that c '(x) increases faster than MR(x). 
15 The reason is the same as for biofuels; the marginal revenue will increase in x in this case. 
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special linear case, we can show that we will never get higher xM and lower xC for the same set of 
demand and cost functions. Again, the reason is that the demand function becomes more inelastic with 
increased fuel-efficiency standards, making it more profitable for the monopolist to reduce supply. If 
we rather assumed a marginal cost curve lying below the crossing point for the two demand curves 
(which we know is equivalent to inelastic demand in the competitive outcome), oil demand would 
decrease in the competitive case, too. On the other hand, if the marginal cost curve were lying above 
the crossing point for the two MR-curves, we would get higher demand in both cases.  
 
Figure 2. Impacts of emissions standards in the oil market 
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To sum up the quantity effects in competitive and monopoly markets (see Table 1), the effects of 
regulations become somewhat more ambiguous with market power. Still, in most realistic cases, the 
analysis suggests that oil consumption will fall irrespective of policy instrument and market setting 
studied above. Moreover, it is difficult to state in general terms whether the quantity reductions are 
largest in a competitive or a monopoly market. The brief discussions of the special linear case may 
indicate, however, that the relative output reduction may be biggest in the monopoly market except in 
the tax case, as the demand functions become more inelastic when introducing biofuel shares and fuel 
efficiency. 
 
Table 1. Quantity effects of policy instruments in competitive (C) and monopoly (M) markets 
 Fuel tax Biofuel share Efficiency standard 
C Negative Negative 
Negative  if ε(xC) > −1 
Positive  if ε(xC) < −1 
M Negative 
Negative  if γ(xM) > −2 
Positive  if γ(xM) < −2 
Negative  if ε(xM) > −3 − γ(xM) 
Positive  if ε(xM) < −3 − γ(xM) 
 
2.3. Price effects 
Let us now turn to the price effects of the different policy instruments in the two market settings. In a 
closed market, price effects are of interest with respect to distributional issues—i.e., to what degree are 
monopolists able to charge a mark-up over marginal costs. Thus, the analysis may shed light on which 
policy instruments large oil producers would prefer and lobby for, given that oil consumption will 
have to come down. 
 
If we think of the closed market as consisting of different countries agreeing on a common policy to 
reduce oil consumption, changes in P can be interpreted as terms-of-trade effects for the different 
countries. Thus, if a country is importing oil, it would like P to fall as much as possible when x is 
reduced to improve its terms of trade.  
2.3.1. Competitive market 
We will analyze the price effect by calculating the price change relative to the change in consumption. 
In a competitive market, it is obvious from the first-order condition (5) that we must have 
 
(6) ''( )
C
C
dP c x
dx
= , 
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irrespective of which policy instrument is used. This gives the following proposition, which is useful 
as a reference for the analysis in the next subsection: 
 
Proposition 3: With standard assumptions under competitive markets (c ''(x) > 0), producer price and 
quantity always move in the same direction when one of the policy instruments are used. Moreover, 
the relative price effect (i.e., dP/dx) is independent of instrument choice. 
 
Proof: This follows from equation (6). 
2.3.2. Monopoly market 
In a monopoly market, however, the price effect depends highly on the instrument choice. It is 
straightforward to show (by total differentiation of (3) and inserting from (5)) that we get the 
following price effects: 
 
 i)     ( )
0
''( ) '( ) 1 ( )
M
M
dt
dP c x P x x
dx
γ
>
= − + , 
(7) ii)     
0
''( )
2 ( )
M
M
da
dP c x
dx xγ
>
=
+
,  and 
 iii)     
( ) ( )
0
''( ) 1 ( ) '( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )
3 ( ) ( )
M
M
dm
c x x P x x xdP
dx x x
ε ε γ
ε γ
>
+ +  − +  
=
+ +
, 
 
where we know that ε(xM) ≤ −1 in a monopoly market.  
 
We immediately see that the value of γ(x) is crucial for the comparisons of the price effects, but so is 
the third derivative of the cost function. Note that x will always be higher in a competitive market than 
with monopoly. Thus, the sign of c '''(x) for x∈[xM, xC] determines whether c ''(x) will be higher or 
lower with monopoly compared to a competitive market. 
 
Let us first look at the tax case. We notice that the price reduction (relative to the output reduction) can 
be either bigger (e.g., if γ > −1 and c '''(x) ≤ 0) or smaller (e.g., if γ < −1 and c '''(x) ≥ 0) in a monopoly 
market than in a competitive market. In the special linear case (γ = 0), the price reduction will be 
biggest in a monopoly market. On the other hand, if γ < −1, it is possible that the producer price 
increases if the inverse demand function is sufficiently steep compared to the marginal cost function. 
17 
The explanation is that the fuel tax moves consumption toward a more inelastic part of the demand 
function, making it profitable for the monopolist to decrease production more substantially. 
 
Consider now an increase in the biofuel share. Again we see that the relative price reduction can be 
either bigger (e.g., if −2 < γ < −1 and c '''(x) ≤ 0) or smaller (e.g., if γ > −1 and c '''(x) ≥ 0) in a 
monopoly market than in a competitive market. However, as we see, the conditions on γ for whether 
the price effect is bigger or smaller is completely turned around compared to the tax case. Thus, in the 
special linear case (γ = 0), the price reduction will be smallest in a monopoly market. It also follows 
that the price reduction in a monopoly market will be smaller with a biofuel share than with a tax. As 
explained above, the demand curve facing the monopolist becomes steeper (more inelastic) only in the 
former case, and thus it becomes more profitable to withhold production. If the inverse demand 
function is very convex (γ < −2), we know from the discussion in Section 2.2.2 that oil consumption 
will increase when a biofuel share is imposed. Equation (7) ii) shows that the price will decrease also 
in this case. Thus, the price will unambiguously fall if a biofuel share is introduced. The reason is that 
the new demand function will always be below the old one. 
 
Last but not least, if fuel efficiency is increased, it can be shown that the price of oil will always 
increase as long as oil consumption decreases.16 This effect, which is shown in Figure 2 in the linear 
demand case, is completely opposite of the price effect in a competitive market, where the price and 
quantity always move in the same direction (see equation (6)). If increased fuel efficiency stimulates 
oil consumption, the price effect is ambiguous and depends on the marginal cost and inverse demand 
functions. 
 
We can summarize the conclusions in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: With a monopoly supplying oil,  
• introducing fuel taxes will reduce the producer price if γ > −1 but possibly increase 
the producer price if γ < −1 and the inverse demand function is sufficiently steep 
compared to the marginal cost function; 
• introducing a biofuel requirement will always reduce the producer price; and 
• increasing fuel efficiency will increase the producer price if oil consumption 
decreases but may either increase or decrease price if oil consumption increases. 
                                                     
16 Note that xM decreases if 3 + ε + γ > 0; see (5) iii). Thus, the denominator in (7) iii) is positive. The first term in the 
numerator is negative since ε ≤ −1, and the second term is also negative when 3 + γ + ε > 0. 
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Proof: This follows from equation (7) and the discussion above. 
 
Given a monopoly market, there are several policy implications to be drawn from the price effects in 
Proposition 4. A government may prefer the oil price to decrease or increase depending on the 
country’s situation. We will return to this after discussing the open economy with a dominant 
producer, as this is a more relevant market situation, and because price effects are particularly 
important in an open economy due to terms-of-trade effects and carbon leakage.  
 
Table 2 sums up the price effects of the three policy instruments for the different market assumptions, 
showing that the direction of change depends significantly on the market setting.  
 
Table 2. Price effects of policy instruments in competitive (C) and monopoly (M) markets 
 Fuel tax Biofuel share Efficiency standard 
dxC < 0 Negative Negative Negative 
C 
dxC > 0 N/A N/A Positive 
dxM < 0 ? Negative Positive 
M 
dxM > 0 N/A Negative ? 
 
3. Transport regulations in an open economy  
In the preceding section, we learned that the price effect of reducing oil consumption is independent of 
the policy instrument in a competitive market but highly dependent on the instrument choice in a 
monopoly market. In particular, whereas a biofuel share and, most likely, a fuel tax will reduce the 
producer price of oil in a monopoly market, increased efficiency will increase the price, given that the 
instrument leads to lower oil consumption. In this section, we will explore this issue further in an open 
economy with either a monopolist or a dominant firm with a competitive fringe. As the analysis 
becomes more complicated in an open economy, we will make a number of simplifying assumptions 
and also present some numerical illustrations. The analytical derivations and expressions are left to the 
appendix, whereas their implications are discussed in the main text below. 
 
Consider now that the world is divided into two oil consuming regions: Region A and B. Region A 
imports oil from Region B, which has a dominant firm (D) and a competitive fringe (F) with linear 
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marginal cost functions.17 Both regions are assumed to have linear transport demand functions. 
Moreover, we disregard transport regulations in Region B.  
 
It turns out that is difficult to derive analytical and interpretable expressions in the case of a dominant 
firm with a competitive fringe (except in the tax case). Thus, in the first subsection below we consider 
a monopoly market and examine the effects of the policy instruments in this market setting. We also 
present some numerical illustrations. Then, in Subsection 3.2, we present some numerical illustrations 
showing how the existence of a competitive fringe affects the results. 
3.1. Monopoly market 
As shown in the appendix (equations (A17)-(A19)), a fuel tax and a biofuel share will unambiguously 
reduce the producer price of oil and consumption in Region A, and thus increase consumption in 
Region B, causing carbon leakage. Increased fuel efficiency, however, will unambiguously increase 
the producer price of oil and hence reduce consumption in Region B. The effects on consumption in 
Region A are ambiguous and depend on the steepness of the demand curve in Region B as well as the 
marginal costs of the monopolist. These results are consistent with the results found in Section 2 in the 
case of a closed market.18  
 
Let us examine more closely in which cases increased fuel efficiency will reduce fuel consumption in 
Region A. Define Region B to be large compared to Region A when oil demand is higher in region B 
than A. Examination of equation (A17) in the appendix reveals that the sign of dxA/dm more likely will 
be positive when Region A is small compared to Region B (e.g., let β2 → 0). Thus, a small country 
facing a monopolist on the world market should not introduce fuel-efficiency standards if it aims to 
reduce its consumption (given the simple model framework used here). The explanation is that the 
equilibrium price in a monopoly market with linear demand functions will be above the intersection 
between the old and new demand curve shown in Figure 1. As Region A is small, the demand curve in 
Region B will be relatively flat in comparison; thus the small region has little influence on the price, 
and consumption will increase. 
 
If the two regions are equally large, increased fuel efficiency will reduce oil consumption in Region A 
if and only if the two demand curves are substantially (i.e., 3.6 times) steeper than the marginal cost 
function of the monopolist. Moreover, consumption in Region A will always increase if the marginal 
                                                     
17 Conclusions regarding prices and consumption will not change if the competitive fringe is located in region A. 
18 A closed market can be seen as a special case of an open market with Region B becoming infinitely small. 
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cost function is at least twice as steep as the demand function in Region A, irrespective of the size of 
Region B. The intuition is that the marginal cost curve then crosses above the intersection between the 
old and new marginal revenue curve (see Figure 2). On the other hand, if Region B is small compared 
to Region A, consumption will decrease in the latter region if the marginal cost curve is not too steep 
compared to the demand curve in Region A. In the limit, when Region B is infinitely small, we notice 
that the results are consistent with the findings for a closed market in Section 2.  
 
The main results can be summarized in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: Consider a world consisting of two regions (A and B), with a monopoly in Region B 
supplying oil, and linear demand and marginal cost functions. Increased fuel-efficiency standards in 
Region A will then 
• increase oil consumption in this region if Region A is sufficiently small compared to 
Region B, or if marginal costs of the oil producer are sufficiently high; and 
• increase the producer price of oil. 
 
Proof: This follows from the discussion above. 
 
Now focus on the situations where the policy instruments lead to reduced oil consumption in Region 
A. We know from above that the fuel tax and the biofuel share will reduce the producer price of oil, 
whereas fuel efficiency will increase the price. But how much will it change relative to the 
consumption reduction, and how does it depend on demand and marginal cost functions? In Figure 3, 
we assume that the two regions are of the same size, and vary the steepness of the marginal cost 
function (denoted cD2, cf. the appendix).19  
 
                                                     
19 When cD2 = 0.5, the marginal cost curve of the monopolist (dominant firm in Figures 5-6) and the global demand curve 
have the same steepness. 
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Figure 3. Effects on the producer price of oil (dP/dxA) under different policy instruments 
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The figure shows that the price reduction will be consistently and significantly larger if a tax is 
imposed than if a biofuel share is imposed. This holds more generally, unless the marginal cost 
function is several times steeper than the aggregate demand curve (which we find highly unlikely). In 
line with Section 2, this is due to steeper demand functions with biofuel shares than with a tax. The 
figure further demonstrates that the steeper the monopolist’s marginal costs are, the more the price 
drops when consumption is reduced by a fuel tax or a biofuel share. This is intuitive, as it is less 
profitable for the monopolist to reduce its supply if marginal costs drop significantly. The figure also 
shows that the price effect is much bigger when fuel efficiency is enhanced and can be very big 
relative to the consumption reduction when cD2 approaches the point where increased fuel efficiency 
no longer reduces consumption, cf. the discussion above.  
 
In Figure 4 we assume that the steepness of the marginal costs equal the steepness of global demand, 
and vary the relative size of Region A compared to B (denoted β2, cf. the appendix). We see that the 
price reduction under a tax or a biofuel share increases with the relative size of Region A. For instance, 
if Region A is two times bigger than Region B (β2 = 2), the price reduction is 50–60 percent higher 
than if the regions are equally big (β2 = 1). Moreover, when Region A is very small compared to the 
rest of the world (β2  → 0), we see that the price reduction is negligible, which is consistent with the 
discussion leading up to Proposition 5. 
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Figure 4.  Effects on the producer price of oil (dP/dxA) under different policy instruments when 
cD2 = β2 / (1 + β2) in a monopoly market 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Tax Biofuel Efficiency
beta2
 
 
On the other hand, if fuel efficiency is increased, we see again that the price increase (relative to the 
consumption reduction) can be very big close to the point where increased fuel efficiency no longer 
reduces consumption (cf. the discussion above). However, as we increase the relative size of Region 
A, the price increase is reduced. This is mainly because the policy instrument becomes more effective 
in reducing consumption when the region is large, so the relative price increase falls. 
3.2. Dominant firm with competitive fringe 
As it is difficult to derive interpretable expressions in the case with a dominant firm and competitive 
fringe, in this subsection we will present only some numerical illustrations that show how the 
existence of the fringe can influence on the results discussed above.  
 
In the figures below, we have assumed that the fringe can produce half as much as the dominant firm 
at a given marginal cost level. In the market equilibrium, however, it will supply more than one-third 
of the market, and possibly more than 50 percent, depending on the parameters of the cost and demand 
functions. The existence of the fringe increases the likelihood that increased fuel efficiency in Region 
A will reduce consumption in that region. On the other hand, it is now possible that the price of oil can 
fall. 
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Figure 5 corresponds to Figure 3, where the regions are of the same size. Figure 5 shows that the 
existence of the fringe significantly changes the terms-of-trade effect for Region A if fuel efficiency is 
increased. If the marginal cost curves are rather flat (low cD2), higher fuel efficiency will decrease the 
price of oil because the fringe will react quite significantly to a change in the price, and thus the 
dominant firm will not reduce its supply that much. If the curves are steeper (but not too steep), we get 
the same qualitative result as in the monopoly case, i.e., a higher oil price. In the tax case, the price 
reduction is much smaller than in Figure 3 if the marginal cost curves are flat, which again is 
explained by the fringe’s responsiveness. 
 
Let us calibrate this simple, linear model to the current oil market, assuming that a common policy 
instrument is introduced in the United States and the European Union, which together has about 40 
percent of global oil consumption (BP 2010). OPEC currently has a market share around 40 percent of 
global supply. We assume that non-OPEC and OPEC unit production costs amount to 40–100 and 20–
40 percent of the oil price, respectively. Then we obtain the effects shown in Table 3 of the three 
policy instruments.20 
 
Figure 5.  Effects on the producer price of oil (dP/dxA) under different policy instruments when 
β2 = 1 in a dominant firm model 
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20 The parameter values of this model are cD1 = 0.1, cF1 = 0.2, cD2 = 0.3, cF2 = 0.6, and β2 = 0.7 (cf. the appendix). 
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Table 3.  Simulated effects of policy instruments in the current oil market, when joint 
consumption in the United States and the European Union is reduced by 5 percent 
 Fuel tax Biofuel share Efficiency standard 
Oil price -1.0% -0.8% +3.9% 
Oil consumption, 
rest of world +1.0% +0.8% -3.7% 
Oil production, 
OPEC -1.9% -2.4% -17% 
Oil production, 
non-OPEC -1.1 -0.9% +4.4% 
 
We notice that a fuel tax and a biofuel requirement have similar effects, with somewhat stronger price 
reduction in the former case. The effects of increased fuel efficiency are strong, with substantial 
reduction in OPEC supply and a significant increase in the oil price. This result, however, is very 
sensitive to small variations in the parameters of the model and reflects that increased fuel efficiency 
has small effects on U.S. and EU oil consumption in this model, such that a 10 percent reduction in 
consumption requires a major increase in efficiency. Thus, the results of increased fuel efficiency 
should be interpreted with particular caution; they suggest that it might be extra difficult to predict the 
market outcome of raising fuel efficiency in some major oil-consuming countries. Still, we should 
expect higher oil prices and/or very limited reductions in fuel consumption. 
 
Finally, in what way do these findings influence the optimal choice of policy instrument in Region A? 
As mentioned before, policymakers in the region may be concerned about both terms-of-trade effects 
and carbon leakage in Region B. The costs of the different policies obviously matter as well, but this is 
not the topic of this analysis. Disregarding also domestic distributional aspects, the “international (net) 
benefits” (dΩ) for Region A of policy instrument i can then be expressed as: 
 
(8) 
0 0 0
B
A
A A Adi di di
dxd dPx
dx dx dx
τ
> > >
Ω
= + ,
 
 
 
where τ denotes the shadow price of increased consumption abroad (i.e., carbon leakage). 
 
If carbon leakage is not important, we are left with xA·dP/dxA, the latter part of which we have 
discussed above. But what if τ > 0? Figure 6 shows how the international benefits depend on the 
steepness of the marginal cost curves relative to the aggregate demand curve. Note that we only show 
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the outcome of cases where demand in Region A is reduced.  The shadow price τ has been set, 
somewhat ad hoc, to respectively 10 percent or 100 percent of the producer price in the figure.21 
 
The figure shows that if marginal costs are rather flat, the different policy instruments fare quite 
similarly. The reason is again that the fringe responds significantly to any price changes, and hence the 
dominant firm has little room to maneuver. When marginal costs are steeper, we see that the total 
international benefits are very dependent on τ, i.e., how much we value carbon leakage. This is 
particularly important for the benefits of increased fuel efficiency. Remember that this policy reduces 
the oil price if the marginal cost curves are flat, but increases the price if the curves are moderately 
steep (and increases consumption for even steeper curves). Thus, the carbon leakages are respectively 
positive and negative.22 A fuel tax fares best when the shadow price of foreign emissions is not too 
high. Then the terms-of-trade benefits from reduced oil price dominate over the leakage effect. Similar 
effects are seen for biofuel requirements. 
 
How large are the net benefits shown in Figure 6 compared to the benefits of reduced domestic 
consumption, disregarding costs of the policy? The answer to this depends on the valuation of 
domestic reductions. If, for instance, we assume that Region A values domestic and foreign 
consumption reductions equally much (e.g., due to greenhouse gas emissions), the domestic benefits 
will be at most 0.07 (if τ is 10 percent of price) and 0.7 (100 percent) in the figure. Thus, we see that 
the international (net) benefits are at least comparable with the domestic benefits and possibly more 
important. 
 
                                                     
21 As a comparison, the average EU ETS price in 2009 amounted to about $8 per barrel of oil, i.e., about 13 per cent of the 
world oil market price that year. 
22 This explains why the fuel-efficiency curves intersect around cD2 = 0.35, with international benefits equal to 0. 
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Figure 6:  Effects on international (Net) benefits (dΩ/dxA) under different policy instruments 
when β2 = 1 in a dominant firm model 
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4. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that the effects of different policy measures to reduce oil demand in the 
transport sector depend significantly on the market structure. In a competitive market, a fuel tax and a 
biofuel requirement will always reduce oil demand, whereas the outcome of higher fuel-efficiency 
standard is more ambiguous due to the well-known rebound effect (though empirical studies suggest 
reduced oil consumption). If a monopoly supplies the oil market, the consumption effects become 
ambiguous also under a biofuel requirement. Nevertheless, in most realistic cases, oil consumption 
will decrease under all these policy instruments, and most likely even more than in a competitive 
market if biofuel requirements or increased fuel efficiency are implemented. 
 
More interestingly, the price effects depend significantly on the market setting, especially if fuel 
efficiency is increased.  In a closed economy, the producer price always move in the same direction as 
the consumption if the market is competitive, so a lower consumption level always goes along with a 
lower producer price. Moreover, the price effects are independent of policy instrument as long as the 
instruments are fine-tuned to produce the same reduction in oil consumption. However, with a 
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monopoly on the supply side, the price effects depend highly on the choice of policy instrument, as 
well as on the curvature of the demand and cost functions. In particular, and rather counter intuitive, 
increased fuel-efficiency standard will unambiguously increase the price of oil as long as consumption 
is decreased. This result, which holds for any downward-sloping demand and upward-sloping 
marginal cost functions, is quite opposite to the effect with perfect competition. The reason is that 
higher fuel efficiency makes the demand curve steeper, giving the monopolist more incentives to cut 
back on its supply. 
 
In an open economy, we show that (now assuming linear demand and marginal cost functions) with 
monopoly on the supply side, the price of oil will still increase if one region increases its fuel 
efficiency. If this region is relatively small, it will most likely experience increased oil consumption in 
this case. Existence of a competitive fringe producing oil, however, increases the likelihood of reduced 
oil consumption, and the price of oil may fall if the fringe’s supply is rather price elastic. 
 
Price effects are important for a number of reasons. A regulating body may for instance care about the 
distribution effects between oil producers and consumers. In addition, an oil-importing country may 
worsen its terms of trade if the oil price rises, and vice versa for an oil-exporting country. The effects 
on the oil price may also be important if an international climate treaty is in place. If not all countries 
have signed the treaty, a lower oil price may increase oil demand in non-signatory countries and lead 
to carbon leakages. Thus, the signatory countries may favor instruments that increase the oil price. 
 
It is hard to make policy recommendations based on the analysis as policymakers’ preferences with 
regard to consumption and price effects may contrast. Moreover, other (potentially more important) 
issues come into play too when choosing between policy instruments, such as cost-effectiveness, 
which is not considered in this paper. If we assume that the regulator only cares about reduced oil 
consumption, a fuel tax is the safest alternative because it will always decrease consumption. 
Increased fuel efficiency is the most uncertain instrument, especially if the region in question is small 
and there is market power on the supply side.  
 
If the regulator cares much about price effects, we have seen that in a competitive market, lower oil 
consumption always goes hand-in-hand with a lower oil price. This gives preferred terms-of-trade 
effects for an oil-importing country but induces carbon leakage and undermines attempts to reduce 
global carbon emissions. If there is market power on the supply side, and the policymakers are 
concerned about too high mark-up for big oil producers or their oil import bill, they should avoid fuel-
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efficiency standards as the main policy instrument to reduce oil consumption because this policy quite 
possibly will increase the price of oil. They should rather choose a fuel tax, or, if the inverse demand 
function is quite convex, a biofuel standard. If policymakers prefer high prices, e.g., due to concern 
about carbon leakage, the conclusions naturally become completely turned around. The same 
reasoning can be applied to big oil producers, who would find it in their interest to lobby for fuel-
efficiency standards rather than fuel taxes and biofuel shares.  
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Appendix 
Closed, competitive market 
The outcome of a closed, competitive market is derived by considering the oil producers’ 
maximization problem when the price is taken as given: 
 
(A1) [ ]( ) ( )Max P x x c x− . 
 
This gives the well-known first-order condition, 
 
(A2) '( )P c x= . 
 
Inserting from (3) and then differentiating (setting a = t = 0 and m = 1) gives the following equation:  
 
(A3) ( ) ( )''( ) '( ) ( ) '( ) '( )c x P x dx P x xP x dm xP x da dt− = + + − . 
 
Thus, we get the following effects of the different instruments in a competitive market: 
 
 i)      1 0
''( ) '( )
Cdx
dt c x P x
= − <
−
, 
(A4) ii)     '( ) 0
''( ) '( )
Cdx xP x
da c x P x
= <
−
, and 
 iii)     
1( ) 1
( )
''( ) '( )
C P x xdx
dm c x P x
ε
 
+  
=
−
, 
 
where ( )( )
'( )
P xx
xP x
ε =  (price elasticity of demand). 
Closed, monopoly market 
A monopolist also considers the maximization problem in (A1) but does not take the price as given. 
This gives the standard first-order condition, 
 
(A5) ( ) '( ) ( ) '( )MR x xP x P x c x= + = , 
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and the second-order condition, 
 
(A6) ( ) ''( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) 0x c x P x xP xΓ = − − > . 
 
From (3) we find that 2'( ) (1 ) '( (1 ) )qP x m a P m a x= + + . Differentiating this expression gives the 
following: 
 
(A7) ( )2 2' (1 ) 2 ' '' (1 ) (1 ) 'q q qdP a mP dm m P a xdm mxda m a dx m P da = + + + + + + +  . 
 
Inserting from (3) in (A5) and then differentiating, using (A7), a = t = 0, m = 1, P '  = Pq ' , and P '' = 
Pq '' (see equation (2) for a = t = 0 and m = 1), gives the following expression: 
 
(A8) 
( )
( ) ( )2 2
''( ) 2 '( ) ''( )
( ) 3 '( ) ''( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) .
c x P x xP x dx
P x xP x x P x dm xP x x P x da dt
− − =
+ + + + −
 
 
Thus, 
 
 i)      1 1 0
''( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) ( )
Mdx
dt c x P x xP x x
= − = − <
− − Γ
, 
(A9) ii)     
( )2 '( ) 2 ( )2 '( ) ''( )
''( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) ( )
M xP x xdx xP x x P x
da c x P x xP x x
γ++
= =
− − Γ
, and 
 iii)     
( )2 '( ) 3 ( ) ( )( ) 3 '( ) ''( )
''( ) 2 '( ) ''( ) ( )
M xP x x xdx P x xP x x P x
dm c x P x xP x x
ε γ+ ++ +
= =
− − Γ
, 
 
where ''( )( )
'( )
P xx x
P x
γ = , and Γ(x) > 0 is given from (A6).  
Open market with monopolist or dominant producer and competitive fringe 
Given the open market described in Section 3, and using equation (3), the consuming regions have the 
following inverse demand functions for oil, where α1> 0, α2 > 0, β1 > 0, β2 > 0 and subscript i = A,B 
represents the variable of region i: 
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(A10) 1 2( ) ( (1 ) )A AP x m m a x tα α= − + − and 
(A11) 1 2( )B BP x xβ β= − .  
 
Here P denotes the world market price of oil. Moreover, we have used that qB = xB (as we disregard 
transport regulations in Region B). We normalize price and quantity units so that α1 = α2 = 1. 
Moreover, we assume that β1 = 1 — i.e., the choke price is identical in the two regions at m = 1. 
 
The marginal costs of producer j is specified as 
 
(A12) 1 2'( )j j j j jc x c c x= + ⋅ . 
 
We assume that cj1 < 1 to ensure positive production of oil. The fringe has the same first-order 
condition as in a competitive market; see equation (A2). Note that a monopoly market emerges as a 
special case if cF2 → ∞.  
 
We will refer to demand in Region B minus fringe production as the residual demand in region B 
(xBD). From equations (A2), (A11), and (3), we have that xBD is given by  
 
(A13) 
1 2
( )
B
D D D D
BP x xβ β= − ,  
 
where 2 2 11
2 2
D F F
F
c c
c
ββ β
+
=
+
 and 2 22
2 2
D F
F
c
c
ββ β= + .  
 
The total residual demand facing the dominant firm (xD) consists of xBD and xA. From equation (A13) 
and (A10) we find that 
 
(A14) 1 2
3
1( ) ( , , ) ( , )
( , )
D DP x m a t m a x
m a
φ φφ  = −  , 
 
 
where 21 1 2 2( , , ) (1 )
D D Dm a t m a m tφ β β β= + + − , 22 2( , ) (1 )Dm a m aφ β= +  and 23 2( , ) (1 )Dm a m aφ β= + + . 
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By using the first-order condition of a dominant firm, which is the same as for a monopolist (equation 
(A5)), we can derive the following expressions for the equilibrium price and residual demand in this 
market as functions of the policy instruments: 
 
(A15) 1 2 1 3 2 2 3 12
2 3 3 2
( , , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
D D
D
m a t m a m a t m a c m a m a cP
m a m a m a c
φ φ φ φ φ φ
φ φ φ
+ +
=
+
,
 
and 
(A16) 1 3 1
2 3 2
( , , ) ( , )
2 ( , ) ( , )
D D
D
m a t m a cx
m a m a c
φ φ
φ φ
−
=
+
.
 
 
 
Equilibrium consumption in the two regions and fringe production then follows from the equations 
above. 
 
In a monopoly market, we have that β1D = 1 and β2D = β2. This is easily seen by letting cF2 → ∞ in the 
expressions for β1D and β2D. The steepness of the inverse aggregate demand curve is then given by β2 
/(1 + β2). We make a final simplification by assuming that cD1 = 0.23 
 
We find that the three different policy instruments affect consumption and producer price in the 
following way: 
 
 i)      ( )( )
2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 0
1 2
A D D
D D
dx c c
dt c c
β β β
β β β
+ + +
= − <
+ + +
,
 
 
(A17) ii)     
( )
( )
2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2
0
2
DA
D D
cdx
da c c
β β
β β
+
= − <
+ +
, and  
 iii)     ( )( )
2 2 3 2 2 2 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2
2 3 2 2
1 2
A D D D D D D
D D
dx c c c c c c
dm c c
β β β β β β
β β β
+ + + + + −
=
+ + +
.
 
 
 
                                                     
23 This can also be viewed as a normalization, if we first subtract cD1 from α1 and β1 and then normalize prices and quantities 
so that α1 - cD1 = 1, β1 - cD1 = 1 (and α2 = 1). In Figures 5-6 we have assumed that cF1 = cD1 = 0, which is not merely a 
normalization, but simplifies the comparison with Figure 4. 
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 i)      ( )( )
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 0
1 2
B D D
D D
dx c cdP
dt dt c c
β β
β β β β
+ +
= − = >
+ + +
,
 
 
(A18) ii)     ( )
2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2
1 0
2
B D
D D
dx cdP
da da c c
β
β β β= − = >+ + , and 
 iii)     ( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 21 0
1 2
B D D D D D
D D
dx c c c c cdP
dm dm c c
β β β β β
β β β β
+ + + + +
= − = − <
+ + +
.
 
 
 
 i)      
2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 20
0
2
D D
A D Ddt
c cdP
dx c c
β β β
β β β
>
+ +
= >
+ + +
,
 
 
(A19) ii)     2 2
2 20
0
2
D
A Dda
cdP
dx c
β
β
>
= >
+
, and 
 iii)     
( )2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 3 2 2 2 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 20
2 2
2 3 2 2
D D D D D
A D D D D D Ddm
c c c c cdP
dx c c c c c c
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
>
+ + + + +
=
+ + + + + −
.
 
 
 
